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On December 8, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court ordered the counting of 
all of the uncounted ballots in the Florida presidential election.1 The Bush 
campaign made it clear that it would seek immediate Supreme Court review. I 
recall saying that night that everyone I knew who voted for Gore thought that 
the Florida Supreme Court was correct and that every ballot should be counted, 
but that everyone I knew who voted for Bush thought that the Florida Supreme 
Court was wrong and that there should be an end to the counting. I questioned 
whether it was likely, or even possible, that the Justices on the Supreme Court 
would see it any differently. This comment proved prescient. 
I never have believed that Bush v. Gore2 reflected the fact that five justices 
wanted Bush as President and that four wanted Gore in that role. Rather, I 
thought that it was much more about how a person’s political orientation and 
ideology determines his or her positions and that this is generally no different 
for justices than for others in society. I remember thinking on December 8 that 
I expected that the five most conservative Justices would see the matter as other 
conservatives did and somehow find a way to write an opinion favoring Bush 
and ending the counting. That they did so in an opinion that makes little sense 
as a matter of constitutional doctrine further reinforced my sense that the 
outcome was a reflection of the larger political forces and how they influence 
the way in which people, including justices, see social issues. 
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 1.  Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000). 
 2.  531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that counting uncounted votes in presidential election 
without preset standards violated equal protection, thus ensuring the presidency for George W. Bush). 
For a description of the events surrounding the decision, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME 
INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); 
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As I think about the Supreme Court dealing with the constitutionality of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act3 during the current term, this very 
much comes to mind. As a matter of constitutional law, under existing 
doctrines, it should be an easy case. The Act is clearly constitutional under the 
commerce power or under the taxing and spending power or as an exercise of 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.4 But the outcome in the 
Supreme Court is very much in doubt because of the way in which the 
constitutional issue has come to be defined by political ideology. The 
Affordable Care Act passed the Senate on December 24, 2009, by a filibuster-
proof majority of 60–39, with all Democrats and two Independents voting for, 
and all Republicans voting against. It passed the House of Representatives on 
March 21, 2010, by a vote of 219–212, with all 178 Republicans and 34 
Democrats voting against the bill. In political debates since, the rhetoric has 
been defined entirely by ideology. In the lower federal courts, with only one 
exception on each side, every judge appointed by a Democratic President has 
voted to uphold the law and every judge appointed by a Republican President 
has voted to strike it down.5 
The question is whether the Supreme Court will follow this pattern. If it 
does and if the Court strikes the law down, what will be the effects? Sometimes 
decisions on issues that seem the product of ideology have little effect on 
constitutional doctrines. Bush v. Gore, for example, had no apparent effect on 
constitutional law in that it has never been cited by the Supreme Court and has 
rarely been relied on by the lower federal courts; it really was a decision for that 
day only. But the positions taken on abortion have had a profound effect on 
constitutional law, as both supporters and opponents of abortion rights have 
developed entire theories of constitutional interpretation to justify their 
approaches, which in turn influence positions on other issues. If the Affordable 
Care Act is struck down, I believe the impact will not be easily cabined and 
many other federal laws could be put in jeopardy. 
Part II of the paper explains why I believe that the individual mandate in the 
Affordable Care Act is clearly constitutional and should be an easy question for 
the Court to decide. Part III suggests that there are constitutional issues—and 
this may be one—where views, including of the Justices, are the product of the 
social construct of ideology far more than constitutional doctrine. Part IV then 
considers the potential implications if the Court were to strike down the 
 
 3.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 4.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to “regulate commerce . . . among 
the several states”); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to “lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare”); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its powers). 
 5.  Judge Jeffrey Sutton, an appointee of President George W. Bush, voted to uphold the 
individual mandate in Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011). Judge Frank 
Hull, an appointee of President Bill Clinton, voted to invalidate the individual mandate in Florida ex 
rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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Affordable Care Act. 
There is an overwhelming desire on the part of many law students, law 
faculty, and judges to believe that constitutional doctrine can exist and develop 
apart from how views on the issues are defined in society. Unquestionably, 
sometimes this is true. But my point is that on some issues it is not; some issues 
define what it means to be liberal or conservative, and on these it is wrong to 
see constitutional doctrine apart from the larger social views on the issues. 
Up until now—in Congress, in the political debate, and in the courts—views 
about the Affordable Care Act have been almost entirely defined by ideology. 
The crucial question as the Supreme Court is poised to consider the Act is 
whether it will follow this pattern or depart from it. In practical reality, this may 
be no more than about whether one justice—most likely Anthony Kennedy—
will follow the partisan pattern or depart from it. 
II 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IS CLEARLY CONSTITUTIONAL 
Under current constitutional law, the federal healthcare law is 
constitutional. It is not even a close question. The key issue is whether Congress 
has the authority to require that all individuals either purchase health insurance 
by 2014 or pay a penalty to be collected by the Internal Revenue Service.6 
Opponents contend that the minimum coverage provision is unconstitutional as 
exceeding the scope of Congress’s powers. But as explained below, the 
provision is constitutional under Congress’s authority to regulate commerce 
among the states, as an exercise of congressional power to tax and spend for the 
general welfare, or under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
It is important to note that none of the challengers to the healthcare law are 
claiming that the individual mandate is unconstitutional as infringing personal 
freedom. Conservative rhetoric attacking the law often is phrased in these 
terms, and the underlying basis for objection is likely that people should have 
the right to be uninsured without paying a penalty if they wish.7 But under post-
1937 constitutional law, economic and social welfare legislation is upheld so 
long as it is reasonable.8 Rarely has any law been struck down as failing this 
“rational basis” test, and not even the Affordable Care Act’s fiercest critics 
 
 6.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2011) (minimum coverage provision). 
 7.  Even the constant refrain, discussed below, that if Congress can mandate health coverage it 
also can force people to buy (and maybe even eat) broccoli, raises an individual freedom concern. Yet, 
the challenge to the individual mandate in litigation is never about individual freedom; it is always 
about the scope of Congress’s powers. 
 8.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729–31 (1963) (“Under the system of government 
created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of 
legislation. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws 
which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or 
social philosophy. . . . [That doctrine] has long since been discarded. . . . It is now settled that States 
have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their commercial and 
business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional 
prohibition, or of some valid federal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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challenge the constitutionality of the individual mandate on this basis. 
Thus, the litigation has focused entirely on whether Congress has the 
authority to require that individuals either purchase health insurance or pay a 
penalty. This is an easy question. Congress surely could have raised taxes on 
everyone in an amount equal to the cost of health coverage and then paid the 
money to insurance companies to provide health insurance coverage for 
everyone. Not even the staunchest opponents of the law deny Congress’s ability 
do this in the same way that it enacted a Social Security tax and created a Social 
Security program.9 Certainly there are those who still argue that Social Security 
should be declared unconstitutional, but that is regarded as a radical position, 
and no one realistically believes that the current Court would even entertain 
such a notion. 
In other words, it is clear that Congress can charge all taxpayers money for 
healthcare coverage and then provide health coverage to everyone. If Congress 
created such a system, could it allow an exception for those who buy their own 
health insurance? There is no reason why not; taxing and spending programs 
commonly have countless exceptions. 
Isn’t that exactly what Congress has done in the Affordable Care Act? The 
functional effect of the law is that almost everyone has to pay an amount to the 
Internal Revenue Service to provide for healthcare coverage, which everyone 
then receives, but people can have an exception to this if they purchase their 
own health insurance. 
Imagine that the Social Security Act was amended to create an exception to 
Social Security taxes and payments for those who created their own retirement 
accounts. That certainly would not make the Social Security Act 
unconstitutional. The Affordable Care Act is no different from this. 
The case has been litigated, and will be presented to the Supreme Court, as 
whether the individual mandate is constitutional under specific powers granted 
to Congress under Article I of the Constitution. Although this is how the matter 
has and will be presented, it is important to approach the issue by keeping in 
mind why overall the individual mandate is constitutional: Congress can require 
everyone to pay a tax to pay for healthcare and let those with insurance opt out; 
that is exactly what the Affordable Care Act does. 
To be more specific, the law is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, 
the taxing and spending power, or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Of course, 
the government prevails if the Court finds that the individual mandate is 
permissible under any one of these authorities. 
A. Commerce Power 
Since 1995, the Court has used a three-prong test for determining whether a 
 
 9.  See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 US. 548 (1937) (upholding the tax in the Social Security 
Act); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act under Congress’s 
power to spend for the “general welfare”). 
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federal law is constitutional under the commerce power. In United States v. 
Lopez, the Court identified three types of activities that Congress can regulate 
under the Commerce Clause.10 First, Congress can “regulate the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce.”11 Second, Congress may legislate “to regulate 
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”12 The Court said that 
this includes the power to regulate persons and things in interstate commerce.13 
Finally, the Court said that Congress may “regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce.”14 Chief Justice Rehnquist said that 
the prior case law was uncertain as to whether an activity must “affect” or 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce to be regulated under this approach.15 
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the more restrictive interpretation of 
congressional power is preferable and that “the proper test requires an analysis 
of whether the regulated activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”16 
Under the third prong of the Lopez test, Congress may regulate economic 
activity that, taken cumulatively across the country, has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. United States v. Morrison,17 which considered whether the 
civil damages provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act18 was 
constitutional, was key in developing the third prong’s economic activity 
requirement. The provision authorized victims of gender-motivated violence to 
sue for money damages. Congress found that gender-motivated violence costs 
the American economy billions of dollars a year and is a substantial constraint 
on the freedom of travel by women throughout the country.19 There was a 
lengthy legislative history of the Violence Against Women Act in which 
Congress found that assaults against women, when looked at cumulatively 
across the country, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.20 
The Supreme Court expressly rejected these findings as insufficient to 
sustain the law. Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that Congress was 
regulating noneconomic activity that has traditionally been dealt with by state 
laws. He wrote: 
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of 
any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s 
 
 10.  514 U.S. 549 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional the federal Gun-Free School Zone Act, which 
made it a federal crime to have a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, as exceeding the scope of the 
Commerce Clause).  
 11.  Id. at 558. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. at 558–59. 
 15.  Id. at 559. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  529 U.S. 598 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional the civil damages provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act as exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause).  
 18.  42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West 2011). 
 19.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 632–33 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 20.  Id. at 628–30. 
CHEMERINSKY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2012 11:22 AM 
6 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 75:1 
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only 
where that activity is economic in nature.
21
 
The Supreme Court found Congress’s findings of impact on the economy 
inadequate to sustain the law under the Commerce Clause. The Court said that 
“[i]f accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any 
crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial 
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.”22 By this 
reasoning, the Court explained, Congress could regulate all violent crimes in the 
United States. The Court thus concluded: “We accordingly reject the argument 
that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely 
on that conduct’s aggregated effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution 
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”23 
Thus, under current law there are two questions in assessing whether the 
individual mandate is within the scope of the commerce power. First, is 
Congress regulating economic activity? Second, if so, looked at in the 
aggregate, is there a substantial effect on interstate commerce? 
It is the former question that opponents of the law, including judges who 
have struck it down, have focused on.24 They contend that people who do not 
wish to purchase health insurance are inactive and that Congress cannot 
regulate inactivity. They argue that it is unprecedented for Congress to require 
an economic transaction and that if Congress can require purchasing of health 
insurance, there is no stopping point in terms of what Congress can force people 
to buy. 
The key flaw in this argument is its failure to recognize that literally 
everyone at some point will need to use the healthcare system. Children must 
be vaccinated to attend school. If a person contracts a communicable disease, 
the government can require that it be treated. If a person is in a car accident, 
the ambulance will take him or her to the nearest emergency room for 
treatment and medical care will be provided. 
Therefore everyone faces an economic choice: whether to purchase health 
insurance or whether to self-insure. Either is economic activity. Congress is 
regulating this economic choice by imposing a penalty on those who choose to 
self-insure in order to create a system where all can have adequate access to the 
healthcare system. 
Opponents of the Affordable Care Act say that if it is upheld then the 
government can force people to buy an American car or to eat broccoli. But a 
person can opt not to drive or not to eat vegetables; no one realistically can opt 
out of healthcare. 
 
 21.  Id. at 613 (majority opinion). 
 22.  Id. at 615. 
 23.  Id. at 617–18.  
 24.  See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (declaring unconstitutional the individual mandate as exceeding the scope of Congress’s 
commerce power). 
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Moreover, the “slippery slope” argument is really an objection to the third 
prong of the Lopez test and not to upholding the individual mandate. As Justice 
Thomas has long argued, there is little limit on Congress’s commerce power so 
long as it can regulate based on substantial effects on interstate commerce. For 
example, in his Morrison concurrence, Justice Thomas objected, as he did in 
Lopez, to the “substantial effects” test as a way of justifying congressional 
action under the commerce power. He wrote: 
[T]he very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is 
inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s 
early Commerce Clause cases. By continuing to apply this rootless and malleable 
standard, however circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the Federal Government 
to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. Until this Court 
replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent 
with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state 
police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.
25
 
The slippery slope that opponents point to traces not to the Court upholding 
the individual mandate, but to the ability of Congress to regulate economic 
activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Under the “substantial effects” test of the third prong of Lopez, Congress 
has very broad power to regulate economic activity, including mandating the 
purchase of health insurance. But this has been so since the Court adopted the 
test. The failure until now of Congress to impose individual mandates has 
happened not because of judicial limits on the commerce power, but because of 
the political process. If the Court upholds the individual mandate, political 
realities make it highly unlikely that Congress will then choose to require that 
people buy broccoli or American cars.26 
The second question then becomes whether, taken cumulatively, the 
economic activity of deciding to purchase health insurance or to self-insure has 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Health related spending was $2.5 
trillion in 2009, or 17.6% of the national economy. In the last case to deal with 
the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, Gonzales v. Raich in 2005, 
the Court held that Congress could criminally prohibit and punish cultivation 
and possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal medicinal use.27 If 
Congress has the power to prevent Angela Raich from growing a small amount 
of marijuana to offset the ill effects of chemotherapy, then surely it has the 
authority to regulate a two-trillion-dollar industry. 
Moreover and very importantly, Raich reaffirmed that Congress need only 
have a rational basis for believing that it is regulating economic activity that has 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and certainly at least that exists 
here. The Court declared: 
 
 25.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 26.  See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (arguing that 
judicial review to protect states is unnecessary because sufficient protection for states exists through the 
structure of the political system). 
 27.  545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress 
that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ 
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but 
only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.
28
 
It is inconceivable that it could be argued that there is not a rational basis 
for believing that, on aggregate, the economic activity of deciding to self-insure 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The fact that some fifty million 
Americans go without health insurance has an enormous effect on interstate 
commerce. For instance, when uninsured patients cannot pay their hospital 
bills, premiums go up for everyone else in order to cover the cost of that care. 
There is certainly a rational basis for believing that such cost shifting 
substantially affects the price of insurance and health services across the 
country. 
Opponents of the individual mandate argue that the rational basis test 
applies only to deciding whether there is a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, but not as to whether there is economic activity. There is no basis 
for drawing such a distinction. The third prong of the Lopez test is that 
Congress can regulate economic activity that, taken cumulatively, has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. There is no reason why Congress 
should need only a reasonable basis for determining the substantial effect on 
commerce, but not as to whether it is economic activity. Justice Stevens’ 
language in Gonzales v. Raich specifically speaks of Congress needing a rational 
basis for believing that there is a substantial effect on commerce because that 
was the issue he was addressing. There is no evidence he meant to exclude the 
determination of whether it is economic activity from the rational basis inquiry. 
In fact, Justice Scalia, in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Raich, 
suggests no such limit, as he declares: “The relevant question is simply whether 
the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end 
under the commerce power.”29 
B. Congress’s Taxing and Spending Power 
Although the discussions and court decisions about the constitutionality of 
the Affordable Care Act have focused primarily on the Commerce Clause, 
there is an alternative basis for upholding the law: Congress’s broad power to 
tax and spend for the general welfare. The Supreme Court has broadly 
interpreted the scope of this power.30 
Those who do not obtain health insurance must pay a penalty, calculated as 
a percentage of income and administered through the federal tax collection 
system. The penalty applies only to those who have income exceeding an 
amount specified by statute and is calculated solely based on this income. In 
2016, for example, the payment by a taxpayer who does not obtain coverage will 
 
 28.  Id. at 22 (quoting Lopez).  
 29.  Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 30.  See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (explaining Congress’s broad power to tax 
and spend for the general welfare).  
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never be greater than either 2.5% of the taxpayer’s household income above 
the income tax filing threshold or a flat dollar amount ranging from $695 to 
$2085, depending on family size.31 
Simply put, the federal healthcare law imposes a tax on those who do not 
purchase insurance to generate revenue that the federal government can use to 
address the significant cost of providing healthcare for taxpayers without 
adequate insurance. The only objection is that the law does not specifically use 
the word “tax.” But as the Supreme Court often has recognized, labels do not 
determine constitutionality.32 As the Court has explained, a monetary exaction’s 
“practical impact, not [its] name tag,” determines its constitutionality.33 
Whether the law uses the word “tax” is irrelevant in assessing whether this is 
an action that fits within the scope of Congress’s very broad power to tax and 
spend for the general welfare. Besides, the legislative history is clear that 
members of Congress on both sides of the political aisle saw this as a tax and 
used the words “tax” and “penalty” interchangeably.34 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit came to exactly 
this conclusion and thus held that the federal court could not enjoin the 
collection of the tax due to the Anti-Injunction Act.35 As part of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the Anti-Injunction Act provides that “no suit for the purpose 
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court by any person.”36 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Affordable Care 
Act creates a tax and therefore said that the Anti-Injunction Act precludes an 
injunction to stop its enforcement. 
C. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
Article I, section 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
 
 31.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2011). 
 32.  See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992) (rejecting labels as 
determinative of constitutional analysis). 
 33.  Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 439 (1999). 
 34.  156 CONG. REC. H1917 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Kirk) (“Among the new 
taxes is a new ‘Individual Mandate Tax’ . . . of $2,250 per household or 2 percent of household 
income.”); 155 CONG. REC. S12768 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The . . . 
individual mandate penalty tax . . . is a tax. It can be called a penalty, but it is a tax.”); 155 CONG. REC. 
S11454 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2009) (statement of Sen. McCain) (“Taxes on individuals who fail to 
maintain government-approved health insurance coverage will pay $4 billion in new penalties . . . .”); 
155 CONG. REC. H12576 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2009) (statement of Rep. Franks) (“It would impose a 2.5 
percent penalty tax on those who do not acquire health care insurance.”); 155 CONG. REC. S11143 
(daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Johanns) (discussing “penalty tax on individuals without 
insurance”); 155 CONG. REC. S10746 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2009) (statement of Sen. Enzi) (“Most young 
people will probably do the math and decide . . . I can pay the $750-a-year tax penalty rather than pay 
$5,000 a year more for health insurance.”); 155 CONG. REC. S8644 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2009) (statement 
of Sen. Kyl) (“There would be a penalty if they refused to [buy health insurance] that would go directly 
to their income tax.”). 
 35.  Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011).  
 36.  I.R.C. § 7421 (West 2000).  
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and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”37 In McCulloch v. 
Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall said that this provision makes it clear that 
Congress may choose any means not prohibited by the Constitution to carry out 
its express authority.38 In some of the most important words of the opinion, 
Marshall writes: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”39 
Chief Justice Marshall’s broad view of the meaning of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause continues to this day. United States v. Comstock,40 decided in 
June 2010, is one of the most important Supreme Court cases focusing on the 
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and it strongly reaffirms the 
approach taken in McCulloch. A federal statute, the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection Act of 2006, authorized federal courts to order the indefinite 
confinement of individuals in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons who 
are deemed to be “sexually dangerous.”41 Earlier, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the 
Court ruled that it does not violate due process for a state to indefinitely 
imprison such individuals even after they have completed their prison 
sentences.42 The issue in Comstock was whether Congress had the constitutional 
authority to provide for such indefinite detentions. 
In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court upheld the federal law 
and stressed that it was permissible as an exercise of Congress’s power under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Justice Breyer quoted at length from 
McCulloch and said that “[w]e have since made clear that, in determining 
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative 
authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the 
statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”43 The Court explained that “the relevant 
inquiry is simply ‘whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the 
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power’ or under other 
powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.”44 
Using this approach, the Court stressed that Congress has the power, under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, to prescribe the sanctions for crimes that it 
creates. Thus, the Court held that the indefinite commitment of sexually 
dangerous individuals fits within the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
as defined by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch. 
 
 37.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. 
 38.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  
 41.  18 U.S.C.A. § 4248 (West 2011). 
 42.  521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 43.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  
 44.  Id. at 1957 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
CHEMERINSKY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2012 11:22 AM 
No. 3 2012] POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 11 
In fact, even Justice Scalia, one of the staunchest advocates of a narrow view 
of Congress’s powers, has expansively interpreted Congress’s commerce power 
in light of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In Gonzales v. Raich, Justice Scalia 
concurred in the judgment and said that Congress had the constitutional 
authority to prohibit cultivation and possession of small amounts of marijuana 
for personal medicinal use.45 He emphasized that Congress, pursuant to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, has the authority to control intrastate production 
of goods that are of a type that end up in interstate commerce. He explained 
that “the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . empowers Congress to enact laws in 
effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to enact 
in isolation.”46 
Ensuring that all Americans have health insurance is a goal that Congress 
can pursue. There are fifty million people without healthcare coverage. Their 
lack of health insurance costs the American economy in countless ways. 
Illnesses and deaths that would be preventable if only there were better access 
to the healthcare system impose great costs on the economy. Delays in 
treatment mean that more expensive treatment is often needed compared to 
what earlier treatment would have cost. At the very least, adding fifty million 
people to those covered by health insurance will have a great economic effect. 
Congress can choose any reasonable means to effectuate its objective. 
Requiring that people purchase health insurance or pay a tax is a reasonable 
way to accomplish it. If Justice Scalia follows his reasoning from Raich, even for 
him the constitutionality of the individual mandate should be clear as an 
exercise of Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
III 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION AND SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING 
If this issue had not become so intensely partisan, it would be easy to predict 
the result in the Supreme Court. But until now, views on the Affordable Care 
Act have been almost entirely defined by political party affiliation and ideology. 
Every Democrat in the Senate voted in favor of it and every Republican who 
voted voted against it. In the House, every Republican voted against it and the 
vast majority of Democrats voted for it. Every federal judge appointed by a 
Democratic President has voted to uphold the law, except for Eleventh Circuit 
Judge Frank Hull, while every federal judge appointed by a Republican 
President has voted to strike it down, except for Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey 
Sutton.47 
At this point in time, there is a strong correlation between one’s political 
party affiliation and one’s views on the Affordable Care Act. The question is 
 
 45.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (Judge Sutton voted to uphold 
the law); Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011) (Judge Hull voted to invalidate the law). 
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whether the Justices on the Supreme Court will follow this pattern. 
I am not saying that every case decided by the Supreme Court can be 
reduced to partisan politics. Of course that is not the case. My point is more 
limited: at any point in time, there are some issues that define where one is on 
the ideological spectrum. In contemporary terminology, to be liberal or 
conservative means almost always having particular views on these issues. Rare 
would it be to find a liberal who is against abortion rights or a conservative who 
is pro-choice. Likewise, usually conservatives favor gun rights, while liberals 
favor gun control. There are always issues which define where a person is on the 
political spectrum and that people use to define themselves ideologically. 
In other words, if a person were described today with the label “liberal” or 
“conservative,” there would be general agreement as to what this person’s 
views are likely to be on a set of issues that at this time define those labels. 
Social psychologists who have studied opinion formation also tell us that the 
identification of a view on an issue with a particular ideology in itself influences 
belief formation. If I see myself as liberal and know that generally liberals take 
a particular position, I am much more likely to do so, too. 
These issues vary over time. In the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights was the 
dominant issue. In the late 1940s and 1950s, it was views about the communist 
threat. In the 1930s, it was views about the New Deal. In the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, it was views about progressive legislation, like minimum wage 
and child labor laws. 
Also, how particular issues come to be linked to specific ideologies and 
parties is often a complex process. For a long time, Republicans, the party of 
Lincoln, were the champions of civil rights, with Southern Democrats as their 
foes. Today, of course, Democrats and liberals are seen as pro-civil rights, and 
Republicans and conservatives are far less likely to favor aggressive 
enforcement or expansion of civil rights protections. It is possible to imagine 
that abortion rights might have been linked to ideology in a very different way 
than ultimately developed. Catholics were long a key part of the Democratic 
coalition and might have pushed it in a different direction, while libertarian 
Republicans might have influenced their party to be more pro-choice. 
It is a mistake to think that constitutional decisionmaking in such areas is 
entirely a product of precedent and doctrine and not influenced, often 
decisively, by the larger ideological orientation on the issue in society. Bush v. 
Gore48 is a paradigm example of this. I often have wondered what would have 
happened if the situation had been reversed and Gore had been ahead by 
several hundred votes in Florida and the Florida Supreme Court agreed to 
Bush’s request to count every vote. I long have believed that it still would have 
been a 5–4 decision in favor of Bush, but with each side making exactly the 
opposite arguments. 
There is a strong desire to see constitutional decisions as the products of 
 
 48.  531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
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interpretive methodologies, constitutional doctrines, and neutral principles. I 
am not saying that these are never important in determining results. But I 
believe that it is a mistake to ignore how some issues come to be linked to an 
ideological view and how much that inevitably influences judicial 
decisionmaking. Nor do I believe that this reduces all constitutional law to 
partisan preferences; it is a logical fallacy to say that because this sometimes 
occurs, it is always so. 
At the very least, the deep ideological split about the Affordable Care Act 
means that it is likely that five Justices will be disposed to invalidate the 
individual mandate and four will be disposed to uphold it. The crucial question 
is whether arguments based on existing doctrines and precedents can persuade 
one or more of the five Republican-appointed Justices to transcend the partisan 
divide and vote to uphold the law. 
IV 
AND WHAT IF THE LAW IS STRUCK DOWN? 
Bush v. Gore has had little apparent effect on constitutional law; it has never 
been cited by the Supreme Court and has rarely been relied on by the lower 
federal courts. The Second Amendment decisions in recent years—District of 
Columbia v. Heller49 and McDonald v. City of Chicago50—are certainly 
important, but it is difficult to see an impact outside of the gun control area. 
But Roe v. Wade has had a profound effect on constitutional theory and 
constitutional law. I believe that conservatives developed originalism largely as 
a way to criticize Roe and having done so are left to oppose other non-textual 
rights. Liberals then must embrace non-originalism to defend Roe. Again, this is 
not inevitably and necessarily so. In the 1920s and 1930s, liberals sounded much 
more like originalists in explaining why the Lochner era decisions were wrong, 
while conservatives were the non-originalists of the time. 
If the Supreme Court invalidates the Affordable Care Act, it will likely do 
so on the ground that the individual mandate is unconstitutional because 
Congress is regulating economic inactivity rather than activity. But what about 
other instances where Congress regulates inactivity? For example, Title II of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act regulates inactivity, requiring that hotels and restaurants 
serve African-American customers even if they do not want to do so. Pollution 
control laws regulate economic inactivity of businesses that do not purchase 
pollution control equipment. Food and drug laws that require disclosures and 
warning labels regulate inactivity of those who do not want to make such 
disclosures. 
These examples might be distinguished on the ground that a person or 
 
 49.  554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects a right of individuals to 
have firearms at least in the home for self-defense and is not limited to protecting a right to have 
firearms only for militia service).  
 50.  130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment applies to state and local 
governments through its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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business could avoid all of these laws by choosing not to engage in the activity 
of running a restaurant or opening a factory or selling drugs. But this misses the 
point: in all of these instances what Congress is regulating is inactivity. The core 
of the argument that the individual mandate is unconstitutional is that Congress 
cannot regulate inactivity.51 But Congress frequently regulates inactivity. 
Moreover, it is a fiction to say that Congress is not compelling behavior because 
a person might choose to close his or her hotel or factory or stop marketing 
prescription drugs. 
As explained above, I disagree with those who see the individual mandate as 
regulating inactivity. All individuals are engaged in the economic activity of 
either purchasing health insurance or of self-insuring. But if the Court sees the 
individual mandate as regulating inactivity, and sees that as being beyond the 
scope of Congress’s power, then other instances in which Congress regulates 
inactivity will be constitutionally vulnerable. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how the Court can strike down the individual 
mandate without narrowing the scope of Congress’s powers under the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. As explained in Part 
II above, under current law, Congress has the power to act under the 
Commerce Clause so long as it has a reasonable basis for believing that it is 
regulating economic activity that, taken cumulatively, has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.52 The Court cannot realistically strike down the individual 
mandate without greatly narrowing this test. Will it discard its rule that there 
need only be a reasonable basis for believing that a law regulates economic 
activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce? Will it narrow 
what constitutes economic activity? Will it call into question the third prong of 
the Lopez test? After all, it is the third prong of the Lopez test, as Justice 
Thomas has often pointed out, that gives Congress such expansive powers. Any 
of these holdings could have significant implications in terms of the 
constitutionality of other laws. 
The Court’s invalidating the key provision of the Affordable Care Act also 
might have important implications for the public’s perception of constitutional 
law and the Supreme Court. At least since Richard Nixon ran for president in 
1968, conservatives have wrapped themselves in the rhetoric of judicial 
deference and restraint and accused liberals of judicial activism. But striking 
down the individual mandate would have to be perceived as judicial activism, 
however that phrase is defined. A consequence of the Court effectively 
nullifying the Affordable Care Act hopefully would be that finally people would 
perceive that the real judicial activism today is from the right. Perhaps that 
would finally help put an end to the misleading and inaccurate rhetoric that has 
surrounded constitutional law for decades.53 
 
 51.  See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (striking down individual 
mandate and emphasizing that it is regulating inactivity). 
 52.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 53.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION (2010).  
CHEMERINSKY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2012 11:22 AM 
No. 3 2012] POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 15 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between ideology and constitutional decisionmaking by the 
Supreme Court is a complex one: ideology neither always nor never explains 
results. There are some issues in each generation that come to define what it 
means to hold a certain ideology, such as what it means to be liberal or 
conservative. At this moment, this is true of the Affordable Care Act. The 
result is that a constitutional question which should be easy is very difficult to 
predict. It thus provides an excellent vehicle for thinking through the larger and 
harder questions about the relationship between ideology and constitutional 
decisionmaking. 
This article was written in October 2011, when the Court was on the verge 
of granting certiorari and considering the constitutionality of the Affordable 
Care Act. It was written at a time when it remained possible to hope that the 
Court would transcend the partisanship surrounding the Act and apply existing 
constitutional doctrines to uphold the individual mandate. Until 10:00 p.m. on 
December 12, 2000, I hoped that the Justices on the Supreme Court would not 
see the issues in the Florida presidential election through partisan lenses. I have 
that same hope with regard to the constitutionality of the individual mandate. 
 
